LUC: a path to dependence

By Rosanna Cohn

Earlier this week I had a meeting with the study advisor at LUC. As I walked out of her office I thought to myself: ‘pff, maybe I made the wrong choice going to LUC; another bachelor would have been much better for me.’ However, not one moment I considered switching studies. Why haven’t I?

Pierson argues that exploring path dependence helps understanding self-reinforcing processes in political development. However, also smaller, individuals’ self-reinforcing processes can be explained through path dependence. Increasing returns make it increasingly more difficult to switch off a particular path: the further you go down a path, the more you gain from staying on that path, and the more costly it becomes to switch paths. Unfortunately, the chosen path can turn out not to be the most efficient or rewarding one, just like in my case.

As graduation is getting closer, the costs of switching get higher. This is not only because the longer one studies, the more one has paid for tuition: also learning effects play a role. As the years proceeded, I have learned to work within LUC’s school system and how to get most out of it, from working in small seminars to tackling problems I encounter. If I were to switch to another bachelor, I would have to start over and get used to a very different system. Furthermore, over the years I have invested in developing my niche within The Hague (e.g. where to go out, sports team). Since The Hague barely hosts any studies, switching would imply moving to another city and thus losing these investments.

The path does not end after graduation though: once you are done, you will still be tied to the path. Whether you want to proceed onto a master’s or get a job – the choice is limited by your bachelor choice. And again, switching off the path by starting another bachelor is extremely costly both timewise (3 additional years) and moneywise (the government only subsidizes one bachelor).

The World Trade Organization and Path Dependency

By Anniek Barnhoorn

Everyday life revolves around change, whether environmental, social, economical or political. Within each of these categories, institutions play a crucial role. Whilst each is intrinsically different, institutions change throughout temporal dimensions. One of the challenges associated with institutional change is path dependency, a phenomenon that enforces the direction of a certain path, thereby often making institutions difficult to change.

This phenomenon can be seen in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Set up in 1995 the WTO is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. The WTO is suffering from a steady erosion of its centricity, which will sooner or later bring the world to a tipping point. This controversy is in a large part the result of the 2001 Doha trade negotiations that were never completed. This had a negative path dependent effect from which the WTO was never able to fully recover. In addition, global politics and trade governance changed as international commerce started following supply-chain trade. Thereby making traditional trade no longer applicable to the WTO’s current framework.

Thus, since the WTO cannot recover from its flaws, nor keep up with the need for new rules governing the intertwining of trade, investment, intellectual property, and service, scholars are suggesting a WTO 2.0, a new WTO adapted towards supply-chain trade. Despite having numerous advantages, this solution also has many disadvantages, for example defeating the WTO’s biggest success, the dispute settlement mechanism. Therefore, this case study exemplifies that path dependency is difficult to reverse and that history is of great importance. Finally, despite being tied to path dependency, the world’s most important trading partners should address and adapt the WTO’s norms, thereby making way for the continuously developing new global trade regime. 

Path dependence foregone

By Elize Kaulina

An interesting example of path-dependence foregone, is the story of Jacob Kettler, and the time when a part of Latvia nearly experienced a golden-age. Kettler was the Duke of Curlandia and Semgalia in the 17th Century; as he was Baltic German he spent his youth studying in Germany and the Netherlands, where he studied ship construction in Amsterdam and agriculture and geography at Leiden University. Jacob admired the Netherlands and its society, and believed that it was the perfect role model for the Dutchy of Curlandia, as it too was relatively small, cold, and located next to water; furthermore, like the Netherlands, it was had at last acquired some colonies of Tobago and Gambia. Upon return home Jacob tried to steer his Dutchy towards a golden age based on the mercantilist ideas he had seen in the West; he ordered the construction of large ships and steel mills, as the Dutch had, so Curlandia could become a leader in Tobacco and gunpowder commerce, after having negotiated independence from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and signing the Treaty of Westminister. Unfortunately, despite Kettlers institutional set up, his Dutchy never reached the potential he had envisoned for it; the mills and ships took too long to construct in sufficient quantities for mass production, and his investors began losing faith and patience as he had struk trade deals with Portugal, France and even the Ottoman Empire, but could not deliver enough products. Wanting to expand Curlandia, he attempted a defense reform by introduction of a professional army, but this was resisted by the mannor lords, who feared their lands would be taken. Upon Kettler’s death, his son sowed the seeds of destruction by halting construction in order to finance his own extravigant lifestyle. Unlike Jacob who had studied under the Dutch, having grown up in the most prosperous time’s in Courlandia, and having spent much of his youth in the most lavish courts of Europe (Paris, London, Prussia etc.), Frederick Casimir Kettler was more interested in an extravigant appearance, than in a continued investment in the groundwork of his father. After several defficits he was forced to sell the island of Tobago to the English , which Jacob had valued so high as a means of securing Curlandia’s future, that he had re-conquered it after losing it to the Dutch. With no more Tobago, there was no more Curlandian tobacco, and the negative feedback mechanisms of a shrinking economy set in. Despite the efforts of Jacob, he was not able to set Curlandia on a trajectory from which mercantile institutions could become path dependent through self inforcing mechanisms, despite his clear vision. 

Was Slavery A European Invention?

By Sidi Mohammed

Was slavery a European invention? This was one of the core questions that triggered my mind and was “answered” in the readings we had assigned for our fourth seminar. The readings all somewhat offered the same answer: Islamic slavery. Europeans did not invent slavery, because Islamic empires already got involved in the slave trade in the mid-1400s, which seems to answer the question, but not fully to my satisfaction. In chapter 1 of his Transformations in Slavery, Lovejoy raises that before the mid-1400s “the Islamic world was virtually the only external influence on the political economy of Africa.” Nunn and Acemoglu & Robinson also “ignore” slavery’s ancient history of before the 1400s. Most people who are interested in religious history will know the story of Moses in Exodus 4, in which he managed to rescue the Israelites from slavery under the rule of the Pharaoh of Egypt. Academic articles discussing the ancient presence of slavery seem to be scarce, the recognition of slavery’s long presence in Western civilization – from the times of ancient Mesopotamia – still gets acknowledged. The depiction of “Islamic slavery” as the starting point of slavery in general does not seem to do justice to the long history slavery has in the Western world. An important nuancing of the abovementioned criticism surely denies the deliberate ignorance of slavery’s ancient history, as the readings that were discussed during seminar 4 were merely focussing on the institutional impacts of “African slavery” in specific. Looking at the context of slave trade in Africa, there does not seem to be a convincing incentive to involve ancient slavery in the analysis. Nevertheless, “Islamic slavery” is an answer for the question posed in the title, especially when looking at path dependence and the possible impact of ancient slavery on “Islamic slavery”.

Gabon: Nunn’s Unexplained Outlier

By Rachel Newstadt

In Nathan Nunn’s article, he argues that slavery and the violence the system depended upon led to increased fractionalization, which led to weaker state-building institutions and eventually to decreased income (Ibid). For the most part, this seems to hold true. In the results of Nunn’s regression analysis, it is clear that most states fall along the line of best fit. However, there are a few notable exceptions, including Gabon. In terms of slave exports, Gabon falls in the center of the global distribution, exporting approximately the same amount of slaves per capita as the Ivory Coast or Cameroon; yet Gabon’s GDP is far better than either of these countries (Nunn 153). All three countries are, upon first glance, fairly similar. Nunn neglects to explain why his theory fails in this instance, mentioning Gabon only to claim that there were fewer exports per capita in Gabon because society there was violent and hostile to the Portuguese traders (Nunn 158).

Gabon does fit into Nunn’s other claim that states that were weaker prior to the arrival of slavers were systematically less likely to be a main source for slaves. However, this claim by Nunn is based on uncontested and relatively weak evidence that population density is a good measure of economic prosperity (Nunn 158). Gabon's exception is further compounded when examining the rest of Nunn’s paper. Nunn further claims that factors contributing to the impacts of slavery included endogenous factors to these states. Ethnic fractionalization was an important determining factor for future economic growth (Nunn 165). Gabon, however, has a relatively high level of ethnic fractionalization. The population includes “40 or so peoples” and the ethnic fractionalization, measured by ELF, is relatively high at 0.69.

While Nunn’s theory is overall strong, certain points are uncertain, and outliers such as the state of Gabon are left totally unexplained. 

Modern-day slavery: The result of informal institutions.

By Rachel Knibbe

Slavery has existed for many centuries; however, case studies are not similar as they happened in various forms that differ from place to place and from colonizer to colonizer. Moreover, during the 16th century, the British intensified slave trade and made slaves a product that could be sold on the global market. Although slavery was abolished in the British Empire early in the 19th century, which, according to Acemoglu and Robinson in Why nations fail caused the external demand for slaves to be reduced. Moreover, African societies had organized themselves around slave trade, so they redeployed the slaves on the African continent until late into the 20th century. It will be argued that where slavery still exists, it is the result of removing formal institutions but holding onto  informal institutions.  

Slavery still exists in the present day in different forms in every country. Asia and Africa have the highest prevalence of forced labour. Hence it is still frequent today due to the continuation of slave trade in Africa after the British abolished it. Slavery can be seen as a formal institution that was set up by the British, when they left the indigenous population continued with the formal institution. In 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibited slavery. However, it is hard to abolish a formal institution completely if it is embedded in the informal institutions.

This is due to the economic demand for African slaves, which altered African practices of slavery. Hence it became a structural part of African life. It is argued by Roitman that traditional affiliations are resurfacing in the informal sector. Hence it can be said that slavery is one of those traditional affiliations. It is hard to change informal institutions when they are embedded in society.

The Multiple “isms” in Charles Tilly’s Model

By Jan Minke Contreras

In his paper, Charles Tilly comes to the conclusion that most historical research papers can be classified into two categories (axes) namely the (a) scale of the research and (b) the epistemological assumptions. Tilly subsequently assigns them a certain ‘value’. A paper with a large-scale of research will have a higher ‘value’ than a small-scale one. The same happens with the epistemological assumptions: a paper that relies more on social-scientific concepts will have a higher value than a paper based mainly on humanistic assumptions. 

Tilly’s two-dimensional makes perfect sense at a first glance but, it might become unconventional when trying to allocate account for concepts. For example, concepts like interpretivism or positivism fit quite nicely into the “humanistic vs. social-scientific axis”. Qualitative and quantitative data also conveniently paired with the “large- small-scale axis”. Nonetheless, when trying to allocate concepts like nomothetic or ideographic  into the model it seemed counterintuitive to allocate them in any of the axis. My main criticism here is that these concepts (and many others) would need to have their own “axis”. Nomothetic and ideographic refer to the purpose of a historical research paper, which would require a third axis.  

a. Conventional vs suggested model

a. Conventional vs suggested model

Let’s try, for example, to fit “Colonial Origins of Comparative Development” into Tilly’s model: a paper that is clearly nomothetic. (Model b.) It might seem a coherent model but, the problem is that it looks the exact same way Wringley & Schonefield’s paper was modeled by Tilly himself. One cannot tell the difference as the model ignores the purpose of the paper. Incorporating an additional axis representing purpose, would change the way Acemoglu & Robinsons’ paper is modeled and would allow more accurate classification of historical papers. In a nutshell: Tilly’s model is a good starting point but can and must be built upon. 

b. “Colonial Origins of Comparative Development” in conventional vs. suggested model 

b. “Colonial Origins of Comparative Development” in conventional vs. suggested model 

Some Interpretivist Considerations about Referendums

By Ema Rivas Leal

Referendums are a form of direct democracy, involving the people directly in the political process, usually proposing to them an outcome which they may accept or reject in the form of a single question. The outcomes usually involve core issues, including peace accords, territorial dispute settlements and independence declarations.

The practice of referendums assumes that there exists an answer to a question about an outcome among a population that can be extracted by posing a question to them. In this sense, we could say that carrying out a referendum shows a fundamentally positivist view of the world, making the assumption that an objective world exists and therefore an answer to a question about it can be observed and measured, then the world can be understood and controlled (KB).

However, if we consider some of the problems associated with referendum design, we can see how an interpretivist view of the world would discard referendums as a valid way of approximating knowledge about the world. Some of these include problems of clarity, where more than one issue is being discussed in terms of a single issue; the clear challenge that participation poses for the legitimacy of the referendum outcome; and the biased information that voters may use in forming an answer, especially when the existence of the referendum itself is political (LeDuc). If interpretivism proposes that “reality is multiple and variable” (Eridisingha), an interpretivist would argue that the outcome of a referendum is circumstantial and socially constructed, resulting from the framing of the question, its interpretation by the people that actually voted, and the relative salience of the perhaps infinite sources of information that each voter used to arrive to their answer.

In this way, to the extent that solutions for these issues of referendum design can make use of more qualitative approaches to data collection, we could say that a more interpretivist world view could be beneficial the development of referendums as a tool of direct democracy. 

A Model of Success to Post-Colonial Development

By Morgan Ramkallawan

In the Comparative Analysis of Spanish and British colonies, Lange focuses on the economic models that the Spanish and British colonizers used in order to evaluate the impact these models had on the post colonial development of their colonies. The model used recognized the main variables as the pre- colonial development, the identity of the colonizers and the amount of settlers, the levels of colonialism, the institutions that affect the GDP of the colony. Lange’s conclusion recognized that in most cases British colonies had a higher post-colonial development in comparison to Spanish colonies.

Although there are limitations to Lange’s model such as the time of independence between the colonies, Lange’s model can be used as an explanation for the success of Trinidad and Tobago post-colonial development. After gaining the territory from the Spanish in 1797and officially forming the treaty agreement in 1802, Trinidad mainly consisted of some French settlers, and their African slaves. The British influence over the islands however was quite limited, excluding law and governance and the promotion of English education and language. Moreover, there was no heavy influx of British settlers, rather migrants and labourers, who promoted the agro-economy of sugar cane.

Furthermore, towards the end of the nineteenth century, oil was discovered on the island, the institutions put in place to successfully cultivate it whilst maintaining the agricultural society promoted successful economic development within the island. The British remained influential until independence in 1962, however all the institutions in place remained the same, just loyal to a different country. The lack of extractive policies and little British settlers as well as the liberal economic model, according to Lange, promoted the notion of a strong economy. Something which can be seen today, given that the island’s economy has one of the highest GNI per capital in Latin America and the Caribbean with US $18,600.

British Colonisation in Malaya: A Positive Thing?

Corneill Spaapen

Through a number of treaties between the late 1800s and 1930, the British Colonial Administrators gained control of the foreign affairs of the nine Malay sultanates on the peninsula, with the Federated Malay States coming formally into existence in 1896. Whilst also looking for new resources and bases in the area, periodic raids by Siam (now Thailand), piracy sustained by Malay rulers, and skirmishes between Malay rulers of tin-producing states and Chinese tin miners equipped by Chinese secret societies all threatened British commercial interests and motivated the British to become increasingly involved in peninsular affairs.

Although it is widely ascertained that colonisation in general has a negative impact on the state being colonised, could it be the case that Britain colonising Malaya was the best case scenario for Malaysia? When compared to other colonised nations in the region, this certainly seems to be the case. As two examples, it does seem that Malaysia has done better upon return to independence than both Indonesia (colonised by the Dutch) and Vietnam/Indochina (colonised by the French). Without going into depth into how development is measured, this can be arbitrarily seen through them having lower death rates, a higher percentage of GDP expenditure on education, higher HDI scores and lower levels of corruption.

Although it is likely that there are other factors driving postcolonial development, it is difficult to imagine Malaysia having the set up that it has today without British influence. Perhaps the more extractive regimes of Dutch or French colonisation would have led to the same point today, but as put forward by Lange et al. (2006), the effect of more extensive British colonialism “introducing a rule of law, effective administration, and competitive markets which helped with promoting development in the postcolonial period” can definitely be said to have had an impact. Alongside Ferguson’s notion of “anglobalization” being mostly a positive thing in his book Empire, it may be true to say that the positives of the British incursion into Malaya outweighs the negatives.

To serve or to survive? The Vietnam War and historical institutionalism

By Rosanna Cohn

During the late 1960s, US involvement in Vietnam reached a new height as President Johnson decided to send military troops to Vietnam. This decision added to the already present division among the American people: whereas one group supported the government’s decision, an increasing part of the people engaged in protests against the government. This division can also be seen within the group of draftees. In this post I will argue that historical institutionalism is a powerful approach in explaining this division among the draftees by showing where other approaches are lacking.

According to Steinmo (2008), historical institutionalism combines the views of rational choice theory and sociological institutionalism in explaining real-world outcomes. Rational choice theory considers institutions as constraints within which individuals frame their strategic behavior in order to maximize utility. If one were to analyze the division among draftees with rational choice theory, one is likely to conclude that a draftee would not want to go to Vietnam because of the great risks, for instance losing their lives. For them, the costs of going to Vietnam would outweigh the costs of engaging in protests (a strategy possible within the institutions through the right to assembly and to expression).

Sociological institutionalism, on the other hand, believes that institutions frame the individual’s worldview, which in turn influences their decisions. In this, appropriateness is more important than individual gain. Both the formal and informal institutions had framed the world as being threatened by communism. The important question “What should I do?” would therefore be likely to move the people to be willing to fight in Vietnam, regardless of the possibility of losing their lives.

Thus, each of these approaches merely explains one part of the outcome, and leaving out either one would make the analysis incomplete. Historical institutionalism, by combining these two views, would explain how institutions have shaped this outcome of a division, essentially because it takes into account not only the individual and the rules, but also the context. 

How Economic Ideas 15 years ago created Trump

By Margot Marston

In Great Transformations, Mark Blythe explains the importance of ideas in shaping our interests and the power they have to transform institutional order: both an empowering and terrifying thought, depending on the idea. It can be argued that through the ideas of the Republican party 15 years ago, interests were altered and gave rise to the most polarising figure in US politics today: Donald Trump. 

The Republican party, a strong adherent of free trade and neoclassical economic thought ensured the passage of a bill in 2000 which extended the status of permanent normal trade relations to China. Its aim was to to target the comparative advantage of cheap labor and promised greater economic prosperity for Americans. As a result of the expanded trade, the US outsourced, which economists estimate cost the US at least 2 million jobs in the first decade. Those mostly affected were men with high school level education that saw their wages fall by 15% (adjusted for inflation). A group today that firmly stands behind Trump and his anti-trade ideas and most importantly, more jobs. The initial idea of free trade has been cornerstone of Republicanism, but when this had unintended consequences and yielded economic uncertainty, a form of populist protectionism promising employment and anti-trade, a reversal of former “Washington mistakes,” took its place. “Make America great again,” the slogan ofTrump, the front-runner of the GOP uses the fear and anger harboured after the economic crisis in combination with antagonistic feelings towards China to his advantage to shape interests, and to promise an alternative solution: a change to existing institutions.

Prominence of Anti-Terrorism Ideology after the September 11 Attacks

By Yoon Jin Lee

Blyth (2002) argues that in situations of “Knightian” uncertainty, such as periods of economic crises, “the agents are unsure as to what their interests actually are, let alone how to realize them” due to uniqueness of events. In amidst of uncertainty, ideas particularly play a significant role in determining agents’ behaviors and their outcomes. This blog post characterizes the U.S. immediately after the 9.11 terrorist attacks as a situation of Knightian uncertainty. It delineates how the idea of anti-terrorism gained its prominence during this period and induced institutional changes. Specifically, the idea resolved collective action and coalition-building problems, was used as a weapon against existing institutions and served as the basis of new institutions.

The September 11 attacks left the country in surge of depression and uneasiness. Although responded differently, most people found the threat of terrorism real and acute. Hence, the unprecedented level of agreement on anti-terrorism was reached, which allowed the collective action against terrorism to successfully happen. For example, President Bush gained a broad mandate for his stringent anti-terrorist measures in the name of national security. The president’s approval rating, moreover, reached 90% after the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan. With the change in perception of costs and benefits of resorting to anti-terrorist measures, the U.S. could pursue the common goal of anti-terrorism.

The president, furthermore, used anti-terrorism ideology as a weapon against the existing institutions. He urged for reforms in the institutions in order to defeat terrorism, which had been previously not allowed because of the issues of human rights and basic freedom encroachment. But with the unprecedented level of agreement on anti-terrorist measures, the U.S. passed new legislations and amended the existing ones. One such act was an introduction of the U.S.A. Patriot Act that permitted “the U.S. security agencies to take invasive measures.”This clearly demonstrates how anti-terrorism ideology formed the basis of new institutions. Thus, after the 9.11 attacks that created a situation of Knightian uncertainty, anti-terrorism ideology played a significant role in inducing the U.S. institutional change.

Ideas and Institutional Stability: Dispute Settlement in Ghana

By Camille Steens

Much of the literature on justice in post-colonial societies assumes that the majority of the population of these societies prefers traditional ‘informal’ customary justice institutions. The case study of Ghana however shows a different tendency. In Ghana, land disputes can be adjudicated through different institutions: informal or family tribunals, chiefs’ courts, quasi-legal state agencies and the formal state courts. Surprisingly perhaps, the state courts are overworked by the popular demand for them, while there is popular resistance to consider out-of-court dispute settlement. State court judges are respected and the kind of justice provided by these institutions is seen as appropriate and fair.

This is interesting to consider within the framework of thinking about ideas in institutional change, for before the British rule the traditional informal family courts were the only form of dispute settlement. The arrival of the British brought the system of state courts and emphasized the value of formal state courts versus informal dispute settlement. In order words, the British colonialists in Ghana created a “convention”: a shared idea that coordinates agents’ expectations, as defined by Mark Blythe (2002). Such a convention, Blythe argues, is a function of the ideas that have been used to “dismantle and replace the previous institutional order.” The British colonialists changed the formal institution available for dispute settlement because they had the idea that such a formal system with state courts was the best way to create an authoritative and enforceable judicial system. Blythe argues that once new institutions are constructed out of new ideas, these ideas “underpin” conventions and “make institutional stability possible.” 

When the British left Ghana the institutional order that they implemented remained the preferred route for dispute settlement among the Ghanaian population. This shows that the new institutions constructed through an ideal of a formalized judicial system by the British structured Ghanaians’ expectations about the future by creating the convention of preferred authoritative and enforceable settlements by the state.

Universal Suffrage as Change Driven by Ideas: A Case Study of Sweden

By Marleen Bornat

Traditional theories of institutionalism (rational choice, historical and sociological) are often criticised for being unable to explain institutional change given their relatively static view of institutions (Freidenvall 2008). In recent years, discursive/constructivist institutionalism has consequently emerged to address some of these criticisms, specifically by adding ideas to the analytical framework. In the following, I will illustrate Blyth’s (2002) hypotheses about how ideas can lead to institutional change by applying it to the introduction of universal suffrage in Sweden. Although Blyth mainly focuses on the role of economic ideas, I argue that ideas also provide an interpretative framework in non-economic processes.

The introduction of women’s enfranchisement  occurred at different times in different countries, but it was usually driven or at least pushed for by women’s organisations (Janz and Schonpflug 2014). In the case of Sweden, this process already started in the late 1800s with municipality reforms but it only took off when the National Suffrage Society was formed in 1902 (Dahlerup and Leyenaar 2013). The society organised thousands of women across the country and thus provided a basis for collective action and coalition-building (ibid.). The women’s organisation clearly defined its common end, already evident in its name: the universal suffrage in Sweden. It campaigned for this goal by “writing petitions, arranging demonstrations, and summoning public hearings (ibid.)”. To give an example, they once collected 360,000 signatures in favour of universal suffrage which put societal pressure on the ruling parties (ibid.).

In 1921, a coalition of liberals and social democrats introduced the equal and universal suffrage reforms which meant that women could finally vote and run for office in parliamentary elections (ibid.). The ideas of the National Suffrage Society thus formed the blueprint for the new institution, that is universal suffrage. It also structured the expectations various actors had about the institution. However, universal suffrage by itself did not achieve actual gender equality in politics and arguably, still has not up to this day. For that, one would have to challenge the underlying gendered informal institutions, which shows that ideas may compete and prevent formal change from being fully successful.

Ideas and revolution

By Emma Lucas

Blyth describes how ideas and ideology can influence the development of institutions. In this blogpost I will apply his theory to the Marxist revolution in Russia during the first world war. 

“Agents must argue over, diagnose, proselytize, and impose on others their notion of what a crisis actually is before collective action to resolve the uncertainty facing them can take any meaningful institutional form.” That means that ideology influences the notion of when a situation is a economic crisis, which than means that ideology influences the perception of an institutions that has ‘failed’ and that has to be changed. 

In 1917 Russia was effected by economic downfall, bad governance and was losing in the first world war. (1) This caused civil unrest. First, the revolution focussed on overthrowing the Czar, since he was believed to be the main problem. Ideas influences this decision,  since having a Czar was seen as the institution that caused all the problems. The new moderate government, however, was overthrown after a few months by Lenin in the Bolshevik revolution. Lenin did not believe that the moderate government did enough to lead the country towards the Marxist state. After the revolution, Lenin lead Russia as the first Marist state in the world. 

Marxism is a very specific ideology, since it does not only refers to how the world should be, but also through which process this should be implemented. In the Russian revolution, there even was an ‘intervention’ when some thought that the new government did not follow the ‘blueprint’ for institutions from Marist theory enough in the form of a new revolution. This was a revolution that was caused by ideas about how wealth should be divided and after the institutions were designed based upon that ideology.

 

Ideas, crisis, and institutional change

By Abdel-Jaouad Ouarraki

Blyth argues that Ideologies and ideas in general are important drivers of institutional change. He poses several hypotheses of which the first one is that “In periods of economic crisis, ideas (not institutions) reduce uncertainty”. Blyth argues that in periods of crisis, the existing institutions no longer provide for the right incentives to act in the interests of the actors, as crises are generally unexpected and the sources of crises unknown. Therefore, in times of crisis, Blyth argues, “agents cannot take institutions “off the shelf” to reduce uncertainty, as institutional supply would be random at best, and at worst impossible”. This is where ideas come in as they provide for a framework that makes it possible to interpret the situation at hand, as these ideas explain how the economy supposedly works and therefore provide for a basis on which to act upon.

The financial crisis of 2008 is a textbook example of a crisis that was anticipated by few, and properly understood by arguably even less people. To make sense of the financial crisis two narratives emerged. On the one hand, we have the “socialists” arguing that the banks were given free space to gamble and hence stricter regulations imposed by governments are the institutional solution to the crisis in the long term. On the other hand we have the “capitalists” who argue that the crisis is caused by “profligate governments” that bought votes with welfare spending.

Hence, one side argues for increased government regulations, while the other side argues for less government involvement in the economy. The two ideologies make a different assessment of the same crisis and the institutions that would emerge from either one of these assessments are radically different. Nonetheless, both of these narratives reduce the uncertainty of what to do as the existing institutions simply did not provide for the right incentives to prevent the financial crisis from happening.

The Importance of Ideas: Fighting HIV/AIDS in Malawi

By Hannah van der Ham

 

As Mark Blyth explains, ideas matter when analyzing institutional change. This theory can also help us explain how ideas can lead to inefficient policies. One example is a strategy adopted by the World Bank to fight HIV/AIDS in Malawi. Here, the World Bank applied the ABC strategy which promotes abstinence, being faithful and using condoms. However, the approach had no effect in Malawi as abstinence does not lead to necessary offspring, extramarital marriage is quite common among men and condom use is interpreted as a lack of confidence in your sexual partner.

The adoption of this inefficient policy can be analyzed by applying Blyth’s five hypotheses about ideas. As Blyth explains, “ideas (not institutions) reduce uncertainty.” In this case, there is uncertainty about what strategy would fight HIV/AIDS in Malawi most efficiently. However, the World Bank probably chose the ABC strategy after researching what had worked in other cases. This allowed them to design a policy based on an idea of what might work, rather than a random “shot in the dark”. Secondly, the World Bank’s idea was then shared by other international agencies, making them act collectively and invest money to implement their idea. Thirdly, the idea that the ABC method works was then used as a “weapon” that allowed the agencies to disregard existing informal institutions (e.g. extramarital relationships) rather than building their policies around them. Fourthly, the agencies then implemented policies based on their idea, making it “an institutional blueprint”. Lastly, unless the agencies recognize that the ABC strategy is inefficient, their idea will keep these policies in place.

This shows that the World Bank adopted inefficient polices because they based these on an idea that did not coincide with the reality. Thus, it is always important in development aid to consider the ideas of local agents in addition to policy makers’ ideas. Moreover, policies should be adapted to local circumstances, rather than adapting the local circumstances to the policy. This will only increase the policies’ efficiency.

Arranged marriages in India

By Kelly Ursem

Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky defines Informal institutions “as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels”. Although informal institutions are not officially written down rules, they are able to create a solid structure for society to follow.  Informal institutions can come in four different types; complementary, accommodating, competing and substitutive informal institutions as seen in the table below.

Arranged marriage could be said to be a form of informal institutions; which is a ritual that occurs in India on a regular basis whereby their perception of the institution of marriage is very different than from the West. Arranged marriage is defined as a marriage planned and agreed by the families or guardians of the couple concerned, whereby this tradition lacks any official and legal recognition or support – yet is followed by many Indian families.

This practice involves several processes including practices like matching the horoscope of the couple in order to ensure compatibility, the background of the families and their castes, which are practices that all arranged marriages go through, even though they are not officially written down rules. Whereby originally, the bride and groom are not asked for consent or informed about their future partner, however, with the evolution to more modern societies, both partners are now asked for their consent. Hereby showing how the institution can be changed over time, even though they take a long time to change. Thus, it can be seen that although this is an informal institution, families of arranged marriages follow the same rules and processes that is widely known and accepted within the Indian culture, before the official institution of marriage is carried out.

Wait for people to get out of the carriage, an informal institution in public transport

By Joost Koot

In the Netherlands and many other countries it is the custom to let people leave a form of public transport before you enter it. I would argue that this is an informal institution. There tend to be no formal rules about what to do when, for example, a train or metro arrives at the station. However often it can be witnessed that the people on the platform allow the passengers to get out, before they get in. This is viewed as being polite behaviour.

While there is no formal enforcement for this informal institution, it can be argued there are forms of informal enforcement. Depending on where you do not follow the rule, and who are on the platform, forms of enforcement can range from angry looks to people actively confronting you about your behaviour.

Interestingly, in his book about how American prisons are controlled by gangs, David Skarbek argues that before gang control, prisons were governed by norms and informal institutions. Due to a massive increase in prison population and diversity of the population, this was no longer possible

This relates to behaviour at public transport stops because especially in big cities stations can be very busy and have people from different backgrounds. On top of this, as opposed to norms in prison, the chances of running into the same people afterwards, or them recognizing you are quite small. Also the punishment for not following informal institutions is much less severe within public transport than in prison, where not following the norms might get you killed

I would argue that the reason the norm to let people get out first can still holds is that when entering you are split into relatively small groups. The big group of people waiting tends to split into smaller groups, each waiting at one of the doors. After entering you tend to be in a carriage with the same people as that you were waiting with. The pressure of these small groups might just be enough to have people observe the norm.